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I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article focuses on an Equal Protection Clause issue raised
by a conflict between an existing policy goal-school desegregation-and an emerging policy goal-school choice. This conflict is
a result of school districts' use of racial ceilings in school choice
programs, which operates to the detriment of a large number of
black students. These students are denied access to schools of
their choosing solely on the basis of their race, while a much
smaller number are able to attend school in an integrated setting.
This conflict originates from two sources. The first source is
the nation's effort to desegregate its public schools. The second
source is the more recent and growing demand by parents to have
more control over the schools their children attend. As more public school districts that operate school desegregation plans and use
racial ceilings also implement school choice policies, it is becoming
increasingly clear that the wishes of many parents-particularly the
parents of minority students-are colliding with school desegregation requirements.
Although almost 40 years have passed since the Supreme
Court's Brown v. Board of Education' decision, the federal government's involvement with school desegregation remains substantial.
National statistics on the number of school districts operating
under desegregation plans are difficult to obtain. One survey reports that 960 school districts attempted to desegregate between
1968 and 1986.2 In 1990, the Department of Education's Office for
Civil Rights reported that 256 school districts, with a combined student enrollment exceeding two million, operated under court supervision in desegregation cases brought by the Justice
* Research Fellow, Hudson Institute. A.B., Stanford University; J.D., University of
Chicago; Ph.D., Northwestern University.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 KARL TAEUBER, RESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL DIsTw-rs, 1968-86
(June
1990) (Working Paper #90-16, on file at the Center for Demography and Ecology,
University of Wisconsin-Madison).
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Department.' Also, of the 44 members of the Council of the Great
City Schools, an organization of the nation's largest urban public
school districts, only four had not implemented a school desegregation plan by the 1990-91 school year.4 Many urban school desegregation plans include voluntary transfer programs, one of the
many forms of school choice. These transfer programs, along with
other public school choice programs, often utilize racial ceilings.5
Proponents of racial ceiling policies typically argue that such
policies are needed to avoid or stem white flight from public
schools. Although racial ceilings vary in form, they are generally
used to regulate the demographic composition of schools. Public
school districts often use the severest form: majority-to-minority racial ceilings. As the name implies, majority-to-minority racial ceilings permit a student to transfer only from a school where the
student is in the racial6 majority into a school where the student is
in the racial minority.
With a much briefer history than school desegregation, school
choice has emerged, according to many, as the most prevalent education reform policy of the 1990s.' In response to the growing perception that public schools are overly encumbered by complex
bureaucratic structures that impede organizational responsiveness,
an increasing number of policymakers are turning their attention
to school choice as one approach to improve American education.
Many existing school choice programs, particularly those that limit
choices to schools within a public school district, use racial ceilings
to regulate student assignment and help maintain school integration levels.
Proponents of school choice-even choice that is restricted to
public schools-suggest that such policies might give more parents
greater control over their children's education and thereby force
3 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., 1990 ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL CIL

RIGHTS SURVEY. COURT-ORDERED SCHOOL DISTRICTS,

cited in David

S. Tatel, DesegregationVersus School Reform: Resolving the Conflict, 4 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
61, 63, 70 n.20 (Winter 1992-93).
4 THE COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCHOOLS, NATIONAL URBAN EDUCATION GOALS:

BASELINE INDICATORS, 1990-91 81 (1992).
5 See generally David J. Armor, After Busing: Education and Choice, 95 PUB. INT. 24

(1989).
6 Id.

Typical majority-to-minority racial ceilings provide that minority students

may transfer from schools more than 50% minority to schools more than 50% white,
and white students may transfer from schools more than 50% white to schools more
than 50% minority.
7 John F. Witte, PublicSubsidiesfor PrivateSchools: What We Know and How to Proceed,
EDUC. POLICY, June 1992, at 206.
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schools to become more responsive to students' needs.8 Many
school choice proponents argue that school choice policies should
encompass both public and private schools. For example, there
are those who argue that private schools, because they are controlled more by market forces than bureaucratic institutions, place
a premium on responding to family needs and produce superior
education results.9 Others suggest that school choice policies
might help form non-geographic communities that would establish
and enforce desired norms of behavior. 10 Still others suggest that
traditional economic cost-benefit analysis supports school choice.
For example, one scholar notes that private schools' ability to provide the same or better education for less cost would be important
evidence supporting school choice policies. 1 Finally, in response
to many school choice critics, some argue that private schools promote educational equality better than public schools. 2
Critics of school choice fear that school choice policies will
increase education inequality. Jonathan Kozol, for example, questions whether all people will receive adequate information regarding their education choices. In addition, he asserts that school
choice will also increase school segregation by class and race."
Other critics of school choice argue that public schools would be
placed at a competitive disadvantage if forced to compete with private schools for scarce education funds, partly because private
schools have wider flexibility in selecting students and a greater
ability to expel problem students. 4 Finally, others suggest that the
administrative burdens and associated costs incidental to the establishment and maintenance of school choice programs 15 and the
8 See, e.g., Chester E. Finn, Jr., Why We Need Choice, in CHOICE IN EDUCATION: POTENTIAL AND PROBLEMS

3, 7-12 (William L. Boyd & HerbertJ. Walberg eds., 1990).

9 See, e.g., JOHN E. CHUBB AND TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS (1990).
10 See, e.g., James S. Coleman, Changes in the Family and Implicationsfor the Common

Schoo4 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 153.
11 See, e.g., Paul E. Peterson, Are Big City Schools Holding Their Own?, in THE SEEDS OF
CRISIS (John Rury ed.) (forthcoming).
12 John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets, and Equality in Schools,
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association
(Sept. 3, 1992).
13 JONATHAN

KOZOL,

SAVAGE

INEQUALITIES:

CHILDREN

IN AMERICA'S

SCHOOLS

(1991); Larry Hayes, A Simple Matter of Humanity, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Dec. 1992, at 334.
14 See generally, Michelle Fine, DemocratizingChoice: Reinventing, Not RetreatingFrom,
Public Education, in SCHOOL CHOICE: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE 269, 299 (Edith Rasell
& Richard Rothstein eds., 1993).
15 Henry M. Levin, Education as a Public and Private Good, 6 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 628 (1988).
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oversight needed to protect against waste and fraud16 are considerable and might overcome any benefits attributable to school
choice.
While the academic and public debate surrounding school
choice increases in tone and tenor, state legislatures and school
boards-the governmental units primarily charged with the legal
duty to educate students-continue to explore and implement various school choice policies. Already, twenty states have implemented programs described as school choice. Thirteen of those
states have done so in the past five years, and two states (Michigan
and Ohio) are scheduled to implement school choice programs in
1993.17 In addition to these state-level efforts, scores of individual
school districts have introduced choice plans."8
A school district's use of racial ceilings is at the intersection of
school desegregation and school choice policies. Although numerous legal scholars have written about the legal issues surrounding
racial ceilings, few scholars have examined how racial ceilings operate with any empirical rigor. This Article attempts to do just that by
analyzing, from two perspectives, school districts' use of racial ceilings. First, the Article reviews data from one of the nation's largest
public school systems for the purpose of better understanding how
racial ceilings work. Specifically, the analyses will test the hypothesis that racial ceilings disproportionately harm black students. Second, the Article will review the judicial history of school districts'
efforts to use racial ceilings as a mechanism to regulate student
assignment in a school choice program. Together, these two perspectives allow for cautious predictions about the constitutionality
of a public school district's use of racial ceilings.
II.

DATA AND RESULTS

The Chicago public school system (CPS), the nation's third
largest, operates a voluntary transfer program designed to increase
a student's choice of schools while maintaining a school system as
integrated as possible. Chicago's program, implemented in 1980
pursuant to a consent decree, includes a majority-to-minority racial
ceiling. 9
16 Stephen D. Sugarman, Using Pivate School to ProWte Public Values, 1991 U. CHI.

LEGAL F. 171.
17 CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT

OF TEACHING, SCHOOL CHOICE

(1992).
18 Id.
19 Through the 1988-89 school year and the course of this study, the Board oper-

ated a minority-to-majority (or "50/50") racial ceiling. Since then, the Chicago Board
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Voluntary transfer program data are gathered by the Chicago
Board of Education (Board). Data for the 1988-89 academic year
include individual-level variables for all transfer applications re2
20
ceived and processed by the Board. Data on rejected applicants '
include information on their race, desired school, and reason for
rejection. In addition to racial ceiling limitations, student transfer
applications can be rejected for one of five other reasons, including lack of space and excessive distance between a student and the
desired school.
Data were analyzed with the Chi-square test statistic and statistical significance was set at .05. Because the Chi-square test statistic
is sensitive to sample size, 2 two rounds of analyses were performed.
The first used the entire pool of rejected applicants, and the second used a random selection of fifty percent of those rejected.
The Board's voluntary transfer program is open to all students, and, therefore, the racial composition of the transfer program's applicant pool should generally reflect the school system's
demographic profile. In 1988, approximately sixty percent of the
students attending public elementary and secondary schools in
Chicago were black, approximately twelve percent were white, and
approximately twenty-five percent were Hispanic. 23 Table I illustrates that, as expected, voluntary transfer applicants in 1988
largely reflected the CPS's overall racial composition.
Whereas the applicant pool was roughly representative of the
CPS's demographic profile, voluntary transfer acceptances and rejections were not. The direction of the differences between the
observed and expected distributions among racial groups is informative. For example, black students were rejected more than
expected by random distribution. The opposite was true for all
other students. As Table II illustrates, these differences were statis24
tically significant.
of Education amended its policy slightly, making transfers available to minority students until a school enrollment reaches 60% minority (thereby creating a "60/40"
racial ceiling). Chicago Board of Education Resolution 88-1026-RS1, Resolution Approving Report on the Assessment of Availability of Transfer Opportunities (Oct. 26,
1988); Chicago Public Schools Annual Desegregation Review, 1987-88, Part 1: Student
Assignment Component, 33-34 (1988).
20 N = 4818.
21 N = 2730.
22 G. BOHRNSTEDT & D. KNoKE, STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA ANALYSIS

(1988).
23 Three percent were classified as "other." Chicago Public Schools, Racial/EthnicSurvey - Students (1988).
24 For a fuller set of analyses, see Michael Heise, A Quantitative and Legal Analysis
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TABLE I
VOLUNTARY TRANSFER PARTICIPATION RATES

13.6
White

Black

Hispanic

5.6
(other)

Although it is important to note that black students' transfer
applications were rejected more than expected, even more crucial
are the reasons why the applications were rejected. Due to the
CPS's demographic profile, it is not surprising to find that the
school district's racial ceilings were a major reason why black student transfer applications were rejected. The school district's racial
ceiling was used to reject 819 applications, or approximately thirty
percent. Table III also illustrates that among the six possible reasons for rejection, lack of space and racial ceiling limitations were
the two most important reasons and together accounted for approximately sixty-five percent of all rejections.
TABLE II

White
Black
Hispanic
(other)

Accept
439
1080
401
168

Reject
338
2035
255
102

Chi-square = 273.86

p <.01
N = 4,818
Missing Observations = 0

A critical issue, however, is whether more black applications
than expected were rejected due to racial ceiling concerns. Table
IV suggests that they were. Not only were more black transfer applicants rejected due to the school district's racial ceiling than random distribution would suggest, and all other racial groups were
of Racial Ceilings and Equal Educational Opportunity (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University).
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TABLE III
REASONS FOR REJECTION

35.0%30.0%-

25.0%20.0%

15.0%
10.0%5.0% -

1.5

0.6

% I

0.0%-

Race

Space

Dist.

Age

I

I

-I

Wait List (other) (miss. data)

Reason

rejected less than expected, but a statistically significant relationship remains even after collapsing all non-black racial groups and
all non-racial ceiling reasons for rejection.
That a statistically significant relationship remains, after collapsing both racial group and reason-for-rejection categories,
strengthens the test statistic. The likelihood of a statistically significant result decreases as the number of degrees of freedom decreases. Therefore, by collapsing the number of racial groups and
reasons for rejection and reducing the number of degrees of freedom, the likelihood that the test statistic will be statistically significant decreases. That the results remain significant after such
changes underscores the relationship between student race and
the reason for voluntary transfer rejection.
TABLE IV
REASON FOR REJECTION (COLLAPSED)
BY RACE (COLLAPSED)

Black
Non-Black

Racial Ceiling
720
115

All Other Reasons
1315
580

Chi-Square = 85.67
p < .01
N = 2,730

Missing Observations = 0

To test whether this finding was solely a function of the sample
size, the previous analysis was replicated on a randomly selected

928

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:921

pool of fifty percent of the cases.25 As Table V illustrates, a smaller
sample size reduces but does not eliminate the statistically significant relationship.
TABLE V
REASON FOR REJECTION (COLLAPSED)

BY RACE (COLLAPSED)

.50)
Racial Ceiling All Other Reasons
356
609
55
289
(SAMPLE *

Black
Non-Black

Chi-Square = 50.48
p < .01
N = 1,309

Missing Observations = 0

A review of data from one of America's largest public school
systems reveals that the school's use of racial ceilings particularly
burdens black transfer applicants. Specifically, a statistically significant relationship exists between rejections due to racial ceiling limits and rejections of black transfer applicants. As this Article
discusses below, these data raise important constitutional issues.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Statistical analysis can help identify policies and practices that
adversely affect some groups more strongly than others. Governmental uses of race, particularly uses that adversely affect minorities, raise complex constitutional issues. The Supreme Court has
noted that "[i] n the history of this... country, few questions have
been more divisive than those arising from governmental action
taken on the basis of race."2 6 Rather than focus on the Court's
long involvement with such questions, this Article examines
whether a public school district's use of racial ceilings, such as
those used in Chicago, is permissible under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
constitutionality of racial ceilings,27 lower federal courts have, parA random sample of cases was drawn by using the SPSS(x) SAMPLE command.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 516 (1980).
The Court has, in dictum, noted that "[a)n optional majority-to-minority transfer
provision has long been recognized as a useful part of every desegregation plan." The
Court went on to note, however, that free student transportation and making space
25
26
27
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ticularly in the public housing context. Three cases shape the legal
contours of racial ceilings and public housing.
In Burney v. Housing Authority,28 racial ceilings were used to
regulate tenant selection and assignment pursuant to a 1975 consent decree. The target racial goals were established to reflect the
racial composition of all public housing units located in Beaver
County, Pennsylvania. The district court declined to decide
whether the housing authority's desire to stem white flight constituted a compelling governmental interest and instead focused on
whether the racial ceilings were a "necessary and a precisely tailored
means of achieving" that goal. 29 Housing authority officials argued
that the ceilings were necessary, and presented statistical evidence
to validate their concern.
Despite such evidence, the court concluded that the racial
ceilings violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Fair Housing
Act. The court expressed its belief that the housing authority's evidence supporting use of racial ceilings for all the housing units was
scant and that the racial ceilings were not narrowly tailored. The
court noted the housing authority's failure to present evidence
demonstrating the accuracy of the fit between the housing units'
actual tipping points and the tipping points presumed by the racial
ceilings. "Tipping" occurs when the percentage of minority group
members reaches a point at which whites will leave or avoid moving
in, resulting in segregation or resegregation. °
Similar racial ceilings were used by the New York Housing Authority in Otero v. New York City HousingAuthority.31 To make room
for a new public housing development, the state housing authority
relocated more than 1,800 families from Manhattan's Lower East
Side. As compensation to the displaced families, most of whom
were minorities, the housing authority promised those families priority status for the new housing units. The demand for new housing units from those promised priority greatly exceeded
expectations, however, and ran afoul of the racial ceilings implemented to regulate the racial composition of the new units' initial
lease-up. As a result, the housing authority reneged on its commitment to those displaced families promised priority and, instead,
available in desired schools were requirements for an effective transfer plan. See
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1971).
28 551 F. Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
29 Id. at 764.
30 For a more complete definition, see Victor S. Navasky, The Benevolent Housing
Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30 (1960).
31 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
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rented roughly one-half of the new units to others, eighty-eight
percent of whom were white.
A class of displaced residents who were denied their promised
priority for new housing units due to the development's racial ceilings filed suit in federal court. The district court granted their motion for summary judgment. 32 The court concluded that the
housing authority's obligation to foster and maintain desegregated
housing units was subordinate to its duty not to deprive access to
public housing on the basis of race. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court ruling and held that the housing authority was permitted to promote a desegregated housing
environment even if the program harmed minority individuals.
Specifically, the Second Circuit concluded that, as a matter of law,
it was not impermissible to use racial ceilings even though the ceilings adversely affected racial minorities.3 3
Although the Second Circuit concluded that the racial ceilings
in Otero were constitutional, the opinion's influence was mitigated
by three factors. First, the racial ceilings in Otero, in contrast to
most others, were temporary and used only to regulate the initial
lease-up of the housing units. Second, the opinion involved a motion for summary judgment. As a result, the court considered only
whether the use of racial ceilings was impermissible as a matter of
law. Third, a similar and more recent case also decided by the Second Circuit invalidated a similar use of racial ceilings.
In the more recent case, United States v. Stanrett City Associates,34
developers of the nation's largest housing complex were required
to assure New York City officials that racial ceilings would be used
to help create and maintain a desegregated housing complex and
prevent white flight. The racial ceilings adversely affected minorities, who waited up to ten times longer for an apartment than white
applicants. As part of a settlement, Starrett City developers were
required to make available an additional thirty-five units each year
for five years to black and other minority applicants.
Despite the settlement, the Justice Department brought suit
against Starrett City developers for the purpose of placing before
the court the "legality of defendant's policy and practice of limiting
the number of apartments available to minorities in order to main-

32
33
34

Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1134.
840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
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tain a proscribed degree of racial balance."3 ' The government's
complaint charged that the developer's use of racial ceilings violated the Fair Housing Act's anti-discrimination clause. The district court agreed with the government, granted its motion for
summary judgment, and enjoined the developers from using racial
ceilings.3 6
On appeal, the Second Circuit ignored the Fair Housing Act's
legislative history, concluding that the legislation contained language supporting both integration and anti-discrimination policies. The court instead looked to equal protection case law for
direction and upheld the lower court's decision disallowing the
housing developer's use of racial ceilings.
The court articulated three reasons for its ruling. First, the
court explained, the racial ceilings lacked a defined goal and termination date. Second, the plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence suggesting that the developers or the housing authority were
guilty of past discrimination. According to the court, general societal discrimination alone was "'insufficient and overly expansive' as
the basis for adopting so-called 'benign' practices with discriminatory effects .

. . .""

Finally, the court pointed out that racial ceil-

ings adversely affected minorities.
Cases involving racial ceilings in public housing provide one
important insight into the judicial landscape surrounding racial
ceilings and offer some insight into how courts will treat a public
school district's use of racial ceilings. Some scholars and courts
disagree, however, and attempt to distinguish between the public
housing and schooling contexts.
For example, one scholar argues that although in theory minorities denied public housing due to racial ceilings could become
homeless, the adverse impact of racial ceilings in the public school
setting is mitigated because minorities are not denied access to
public schooling, but only to their choice of a particular school.3 8
Also, the Burney court noted that, unlike in the housing context,
racial ceilings in public schools do not deny students a governmental benefit.
Such a distinction might be valid, but, if so, only to a point. It
35 Id. at 1099 (quoting United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 605 F. Supp. 262, 263
(E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
36 United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 660 F. Supp. 668, 678-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1987),
aff-d, 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
37 Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1102 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 273 (1986)).
38 Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983).
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is certainly possible that minorities denied access to public housing
units due to racial ceilings might not have other housing alternatives. It is also true that students denied their school of choice will
be offered a seat in some public school. Nevertheless, two reasons
suggest that these differences do not warrant different outcomes
with regard to the constitutionality of racial ceilings.
First, the distinction is not necessarily valid. The judicial
records of the housing cases discussed above are silent as to
whether those people denied units were able to find alternative
public housing units. To the extent that they were, their situation
becomes more analogous to students denied their choice of
school, but not access to public education.
Second, the availability of alternative housing units or schools
may not adequately compensate an individual for the government's denial of choice based solely on an individual's race. The
alternative schools or housing units might be inferior, less convenient, or less desirable. If such a denial is unconstitutional in the
public housing context, it also logically follows that a similar denial
would be unconstitutional in the public school context.
Even if public housing decisions do not make clear how courts
might rule when confronted with a school district's use of racial
ceilings, two appellate court decisions, Johnson v. Board of Education 9 and Parent Association of Andrew Jackson High School v.
Ambach,4 ° involve school districts and are instructive.
Johnson involved an earlier attempt by the Chicago Board of
Education to regulate the racial composition of its schools and discourage white flight. Because of accelerated changes in the size
and racial composition of student enrollment at two Chicago public high schools, in 1975 the Board developed and implemented a
Student Racial Stabilization Quota Plan (Quota Plan) for both
schools. The Board regarded the Quota Plan as necessary to prevent further white flight. The Quota Plan established racial ceilings that, in conjunction with a lottery, regulated access to both
high schools. Students denied access to either school were given
enrollment priority at other desegregated high schools.
The racial ceilings at both schools harmed black students. Because the number of seats reserved for white students exceeded the
number of white applicants, no white students were denied access
because of the racial ceilings. The opposite was true for black and
Hispanic students. As a result, whereas no white students were af39
40

604 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated, 449 U.S. 915 (1980).
738 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1984).
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fected, "hundreds of black and Hispanic students were denied admission to these schools . "..."41
Despite this harm, the district court ruled in favor of the
Board's Quota Plan and noted that the plan permitted all students
a meaningful opportunity to attend school in a desegregated setting. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court ruling, concluding that the Quota Plan advanced a compelling governmental
interest and was narrowly tailored. Accordingly, the court ruled
that the plan did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the Johnson opinion certainly offers support for proponents of racial ceilings, two factors diminish its influence. First,
the Supreme Court vacated the Johnson decision. 42 As a result, one
scholar reviewed Johnson's tortured and protracted history and concluded that the case may lack precedential value.4" Also, at least
one court, the district court in Burney v. HousingAuthority, declined
44
to view Johnson as controlling.
Moreover, Johnson's peculiar facts limit the opinion's general
applicability. The court relied heavily on the Quota Plan's guarantee that rejected applicants would receive admission to another desegregated school. This promise was possible because the Board's
racial ceilings were limited to only two schools and other desegregated schools were able to enroll interested students. Because this
condition no longer exists in Chicago, however, the Board no
longer offers such a guarantee to rejected voluntary transfer
applicants.
The New York City Board of Education also attempted to increase school choice and school desegregation by using racial ceilings. Not surprisingly, similar results ensued, and the racial
ceilings harmed a disproportionate number of black students. In
Ambach, parents of black students who were denied their choice of
school on the basis of race challenged the constitutionality of the
Board's use of racial ceilings.
The district court agreed with the parents.4 5 Although the
court acknowledged that the school district's use of racial ceilings
Johnson, 604 F.2d at 512.
Johnson v. Board of Educ., 449 U.S. 915 (1980).
43 Rodney A. Smolla, Integration Maintenance: The Unconstitutionality of Benign Programs that Discourage Black Entry to Prevent White Flight, 1981 DuKE L.J. 891.
44 551 F. Supp. 746, 759 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
45 Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 451 F. Supp. 1056, 1082
(E.D.N.Y.), affd in part and rev'd in part 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979).
41

42
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was benign, the court concluded that its progressively adverse impact on minorities failed to withstand strict judicial scrutiny.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed in part and remanded
the case to the district court for further factual findings. 46 The Second Circuit found that although the use of racial ceilings to stem
white flight fulfills a compelling governmental interest, the use of
racial ceilings tends to "preserve predominately white schools from
an influx of non-white students and, therefore, discriminates
against the non-white community."47 Nonetheless, the court stated
in dicta that the racial ceilings would be permissible if carefully
crafted. The Second Circuit thereafter remanded the case to the
district court for the purpose of determining whether the school
district's evidence supported the fifty percent racial ceiling.
On remand, the district court ruled that the board's evidence
was inadequate, 4 but on appeal the Second Circuit did not completely agree with the district court's ruling.49 In an odd ruling,
the Second Circuit decided that the lower court had erred in determining that the school district's evidence did not support the racial
ceiling. The court also indicated, however, that the opposite conclusion-that the board's evidence supported its use of the fifty
percent racial ceiling-was likewise unwarranted. As a result, the
Second Circuit once again remanded this factual issue to the lower
court for further deliberation.
Although the Second Circuit assiduously avoided ruling on
the racial ceiling's constitutionality, the court's opinion addressed
three important issues. First, the most exacting form of judicial
review is warranted when a government policy arguably stigmatizes
minorities, even if the policy also benefits other minorities. Second, a school district's concern over white flight constitutes a compelling governmental interest, thereby focusing the legal debate on
strict scrutiny's second prong. Third, the appellate court outlined
the extraordinary circumstances and conditions that would enable
it to conclude that a school district's use of racial ceilings was sufficiently narrowly tailored.
Although it is clear that a school district must tightly tailor its
use of racial ceilings, the degree of statistical evidence necessary to
justify the formulation of a school district's racial ceilings remains
46 Parent Ass'n of AndrewJackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 721-22 (2d
Cir. 1979).
47 Id. at 717.
48 Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 738 F.2d 574, 579 (2d
Cir. 1984).
49 Id. at 579-83.
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unclear. In Ambach, the Second Circuit asked the lower court for
school-level data on the acceleration of white students from schools
where white enrollment dropped below the fifty percent level. In a
footnote, the court noted that it did not want to impose an impossible evidentiary burden on the New York Board of Education. The
court also considered such information necessary, however,
"[g]iven the equal protection issues raised by a plan designed to
counteract the perceived problem of a tipping point ...."
Despite the court's suggestion to the contrary, the evidentiary
burden it imposed on the New York City school district was steep.
The Second Circuit has already rejected the adequacy of the school
district's earlier data. Although the Second Circuit theoretically
approved the use of racial ceilings in principle, the circumstances
warranting the use of such ceilings, along with the necessary empirical support for the ceilings, combine to place court approval of
such programs nearly beyond reach.
As the Johnson and Ambach cases make clear, a public school
district's use of racial ceilings, such as those now used in Chicago
and elsewhere, is problematic and will need to survive strictjudicial
scrutiny. A school board's legitimate concerns over white flight appear sufficient to constitute a compelling governmental interest,
but it is not clear how any school board can sufficientiy narrow and
tailor its racial ceilings.
Four factors are helpful in determining whether a school district's racial ceilings are adequately tailored. None of the four are
dispositive and different courts might focus on different aspects.
The first is whether racial ceilings harm innocent third parties.
Data from Chicago show that the racial ceilings harm black students, the intended beneficiaries of school desegregation plans.
A second factor concerns the threat that racial ceilings will
stigmatize students. The goal of racial ceilings-reduction or
avoidance of white flight-carries with it the suggestion that whites
will tolerate public schools only so long as black student enrollment does not exceed a set amount, typically fifty percent. Even if
this suggestion has empirical support, the suggestion encourages
students to view each other as possessors of racial characteristics
and not as individuals. Such encouragement risks stigmatizing.
A third factor is the scope and duration of the racial ceilings.
Even if courts are willing to subordinate the interests of individuals
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to broader social or group interests, racial ceilings that are flexible
and temporary will more likely survive judicial review.
The fourth factor courts will consider is whether a school district's use of racial ceilings is necessary and reasonable. Paul
Gewirtz, a proponent of racial ceilings, notes that "on balance, in
most situations, racial ceilings are not appropriate-more effective
interdistrict remedies ...should be preferred.""' Even if preferable, most social scientists argue that it is difficult, if not impossible,
to measure tipping points accurately. Therefore, school boards
that formulate racial ceilings without any research transform a difficult calculation into mere guesswork.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite the best of intentions, the use of racial ceilings by public school districts for school desegregation purposes raises significant constitutional issues because the racial ceilings harm a
disproportionate number of black students, the intended beneficiaries of school desegregation measures. Public school districts
that are serious about implementing school choice policies face a
difficult dilemma to the extent that such policies produce results
that conflict with school desegregation plans. Data from the nation's third largest public school system illustrate this conflict.
Although it may be arguable on policy grounds that racial ceilings constitute a net social gain because of the benefits enjoyed by
some black students,5 2 these benefits accrue at the expense of
many other black students. Despite possible policy merits, the constitutionality of racial ceilings in the public school context is, at
best, dubious. In an attempt to ameliorate the past effects of
school desegregation, a school district's use of racial ceilings that
harm black students paradoxically further burdens many of the intended beneficiaries of school desegregation policies. Regardless
of which of the four factors a court may focus upon, it is unlikely
that a public school district's use of racial ceilings that work against
minority students would survive strict judicial scrutiny.

51 Gewirtz, supra note 38.
52 See, e.g., Stephen Eisdorfer, Public School Choice and Racial Integration, 24
HALL L. REv. 937 (1993).
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